A Casualty of the War on Drugs: Mandatory, Suspicionless Drug Testing of Student Athletes in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton by Hallam, Michael
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 74 | Number 3 Article 5
3-1-1996
A Casualty of the War on Drugs: Mandatory,
Suspicionless Drug Testing of Student Athletes in
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
Michael Hallam
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Hallam, A Casualty of the War on Drugs: Mandatory, Suspicionless Drug Testing of Student Athletes in Vernonia School District 47J
v. Acton, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 833 (1996).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol74/iss3/5
NOTES
A Casualty of the "War on Drugs": Mandatory,
Suspicionless Drug Testing of Student Athletes in Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton
For more than two decades, the United States has engaged in an
extensive war both at home and abroad against the production and
sale of illicit drugs.' This war has taken on special importance in our
nation's schools, where the use of illicit drugs has reached epidemic
proportions.2 Unfortunately, the "War on Drugs"3 has been largely
unsuccessful on all fronts in the interdiction of drug imports and
eradication of drug use.4 As a result, the use of drug testing to
combat the drug crisis has increased.5 In light of such intrusive
tactics, we must remember that "the greatest threats to our
constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis."6  Whether the
1. See Alfred W. McCoy & Alan A. Block, U.S. Narcotics Policy: An Anatomy of
Failure, in WAR ON DRUGS: STUDIES IN THE FAILURE OF U.S. NARCOTICS POLICY 1, 1-
10 (Alfred W. McCoy & Alan A. Block eds., 1992).
2. See Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1324 (7th
Cir. 1988) (discussing the "plague of illicit drug use which currently threatens our nation's
schools").
3. President Nixon initiated the War on Drugs in 1972. Drug Policy: The Enemy
Within, THE ECONOMIST, May 15, 1993, at 31, 31. Under Nixon, the War on Drugs
targeted primarily the production of heroin abroad. See JAMES A. INCIARDI, THE WAR
ON DRUGS II: THE CONTINUING EPIC OF HEROIN, COCAINE, CRACK, CRIME, AIDS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 156 (1992). However, "it was not until George Bush's term that the war
began in earnest." Drug Policy: The Enemy Within, supra, at 31. President Bush
appointed a "drug tzar" and spent $40 billion in an attempt to win the War on Drugs. Id.
4. See David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural Fairness and
Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 237 (stating that "the War on Drugs has
failed to reduce significantly, much less eliminate, drugs as a problem in our society");
Kevin B. Zeese, America Has Already Lost the War on Drugs, in WAR ON DRUGS:
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 36, 40 (Neal Bernards ed., 1990) [hereinafter OPPOSING
VIEWPOINTS] (stating that "interdiction programs and eradication efforts have not stopped
the flow of drugs into the United States"). But see The War on Drugs is Necessary, in
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, supra, at 17, 19 (declaring that the War on Drugs has been
successful).
5. See Steven Wisotsky, The War on Drugs Violates Civil Liberties, in OPPOSING
VIEWPOINTS, supra note 4, at 59, 60-62.
6. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2407 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). One commentator contends that "[a]s long as we approach the problem of
drugs in terms of warfare, and total war with the objective of unconditional surrender at
that, it is likely that civil liberties will suffer as they have during other wars." Paul
Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL.
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United States Supreme Court's acceptance of suspicionless drug
testing of student athletes is a "hysterical overreaction[]" or whether
this crisis "serve[s] precisely as the compelling state interest that we
have said may justify a measured intrusion on constitutional rights"7
remains to be seen. One must wonder, however, if the Court's recent
decision in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton s signifies that "the
first, and worst, casualty of the war on drugs will be the precious
liberties of our citizens." 9
In Acton, the Supreme Court found that the suspicionless drug
testing of student athletes was constitutional under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution."0 The
Court engaged in a balancing of interests and ruled that the intrusion
upon the student athletes did not outweigh the interest of school
officials in deterring drug use among the student population and
preventing injuries caused by the impairment of student athletes."
This Note first discusses the facts of Acton, the outcomes in the
lower courts, and the various opinions of the Supreme Court Jus-
tices.12 Following an examination of the history of administrative
Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1389, 1390 (1993) (footnotes omitted); see also Steven A. Saltzburg, Another
Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As Illustrated by the Open Fields
Doctrine), 48 U. PiTr. L. REv. 1, 25 (1986) (declaring that the "most important victim of
illegal drugs may be the liberty of a nation"); Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging
"Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 907 (1987) (stating that
Fourth Amendment rights have been "whittled away" by the War on Drugs).
7. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2407 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
8. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995)
9. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 636 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Courts are in a position to curtail these encroachments upon our liberty
by "stand[ing] between forces seeking to investigate and convict and the individuals who
are the targets of these forces." Saltzburg, supra note 6, at 3. According to Professor
Saltzburg, "Courts that turn their backs on constitutional principles do no service to the
nation in the long run, notwithstanding any perceived short run gains resulting from their
toleration of practices that ought to be condemned." Id.
10. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment "extends this constitutional
guarantee to searches and seizures by state officers." Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390 (citing
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960)).
11. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396-97.
12. See infra notes 17-64 and accompanying text.
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and "stop and frisk" searches under the Fourth Amendment, 3 the
Note highlights recent judicial treatment of school searches and drug
testing. 4 The Note then analyzes the standing and influence of
Acton within this line of precedent'1 Finally, the Note considers
Acton's focus upon student athletes and discusses the possible
extension of suspicionless drug testing to all of our nation's
students.16
In the logging community of Veronia, Oregon, the Vernonia
School District 47J controls the operations of one high school and
three grade schools. 17  No drug problem existed in the Vernonia
Schools until the latter part of the 1980s. 8 An escalating number of
disciplinary actions taken by the school during this time reflected this
growing problem; although drug use was not limited to any one
segment of the school population, the district court found that student
athletes were the "leaders of the drug culture."'2 Student athletes'
use of drugs persuaded school officials that drug use affected the
entire student body and added to the risk of injury to athletes who
competed while under the influence of drugs.2'
In response to the drug use, therefore, school officials, with the
approval of the parents and the school board, implemented a Student
Athlete Drug Policy.22 The policy covers all students who wish to
13. See infra notes 65-105 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 106-62 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 163-208 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 209-30 and accompanying text.
17. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2388.
18. Id.
19. Id. The disciplinary actions came in response to rude behavior and "outbursts of
profane language." Id. As the district court explained:
The coincidence of an almost three-fold increase in classroom disruptions and
disciplinary reports along with the staff's direct observations of students using
drugs or glamorizing drug and alcohol use led the administration to the
inescapable conclusion that the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug
abuse as well as the student's misperception about the drug culture.
Id. at 2389 (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or.
1992), rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995)).
20. Id. at 2388-89 (citing Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D.
Or. 1992), rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995)). This finding
resulted from an investigation that was conducted by the school's administration. Acton,
796 F. Supp. at 1357. The administration believed that "the corruption of the school's
leading athletes might have a significant poisoning impact upon the broader student
population." Id.
21. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
22. Id The Student Athlete Drug Policy was approved unanimously by all parents
who attended a special "input night." Id. Before the adoption of the drug policy, school
officials tried a program of "special classes, speakers, and presentations." Id This
1996]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
participate in the interscholastic athletics program.' Student athletes
and their parents must sign a written form consenting to drug testing
at the beginning of each sport's season and to random drug testing
throughout the season.24 The drug policy requires the student to
provide a urine sample while under the supervision of a monitor.'
After the student provides the sample, a private laboratory tests the
urine for cocaine, marijuana, and amphetamines.2 6
Upon completion of the testing, the laboratory releases the
results only to the school superintendent, principals and vice-
principals, and athletic directors.27 If a urinalysis produces a positive
result, the school immediately tests the student a second time.' If
the second test is also positive, the school gives the student the option
of participating in a drug assistance program or "suffering suspension
from athletics for the remainder of the current season and the next
athletic season."2 9
program proved to be an ineffective means of deterring drug use, as did the use of a drug-
sniffing dog. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. The school conducts the random testing as follows: "[O]nce each week of the
season the names of the athletes are placed in a 'pool' from which a student, with the
supervision of two adults, blindly draws the names of 10% of the athletes for random
testing." Id.
25. Id. The policy requires the student to produce the urine sample in an empty
locker room under supervision of an adult. Id. Boys produce a sample while standing at
a urinal with their back to the monitor. Id. Girls are allowed to produce a sample in a
bathroom stall. Id. During testing of both sexes, the monitor listens for "normal sounds
of urination." Id.
26. Id. The urine may also be tested for traces of other drugs, such as LSD, at the
request of the school. Id. Curiously, student athletes are generally not tested for alcohol
or steroids. Petitioner's Brief at 9, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995)
(No. 94-590). As the respondent noted, alcohol is "perhaps the most commonly abused
drug, at all age levels." Respondents' Brief at 9, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S.
Ct. 2386 (1995) (No. 94-590); see also RICHARD R. POWELL El AL., CLASSROOMS UNDER
THE INFLUENCE: ADDICrED FAMILIES/ADDICFED STUDENTS 36 (1995) (stating that "from
1976 to 1984, alcoholic beverages were tried at least once by over 90% of the student
population"). Additionally, a study released in 1994 estimated that steroids, which are
often used to enhance athletic performance, were taken by "more than 200,000 high school
males nationwide ... within the year." Skip Rozin et al., Steroids: A Spreading Peril,
Bus. WK., June 19, 1995, at 138. A similar study estimated that the number was closer to
500,000. Id. If deterring drug use among the student population is a goal that schools
hope to achieve, then it would seem that schools must test for alcohol and steroids-two
drugs that have been proven to be prevalent among high school students. The efficacy of
a drug testing program that does not test for alcohol or steroids is questionable.
27. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
28. Id. at 2390.
29. Id. If the second test is negative, no action is taken against the student. Id. A
third offense results in suspension for the current season and the two following seasons.
Id.
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In 1991, James Acton, a seventh-grader in the Vernonia schools
who wanted to play football, refused to consent to drug testing.3" As
a result, the Vernonia School District denied him the opportunity to
participate.3' In response, James and his family brought suit seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief on the grounds that the drug policy
violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, as well as Article 1, Section 9 of the Oregon
Constitution. 2 At the conclusion of a bench trial, the district court
denied the Actons' claim, finding that the Student Athlete Drug
Policy was reasonable.33 Upon denial, the Actons appealed, and the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 4 The court of
appeals focused primarily on the Oregon Constitution35 in finding
that the school's interest in preventing drug use was not so compelling
as to outweigh the student athletes' right to privacy.36
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and
remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit.37 Justice Scalia, writing for
30. l
31. Id.
32. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1356 (D. Or. 1992), rev'd, 23
F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995); see supra note 10 (quoting the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution). The Oregon
Constitution states in pertinent part:
No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
OR. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9. See infra note 151 for a discussion of other cases involving state
constitutional challenges to drug testing programs for student athletes.
33. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1368.
34. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1527 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115
S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
35. Because the Oregon Constitution could provide more protection than the United
States Constitution, the court of appeals chose to "refer to the guideposts set out ... by
the Oregon courts." Id. at 1519. However, in the "specific area of urine testing-the core
issue in this case-[the court of appeals] unabashedly refer[red] to federal law." Id.
36. Id. at 1521-27.
37. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion and was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer. Id. at
2388. Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor wrote a dissent, in which she was joined by Justices Stevens and Souter.
Id. at 2397 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The majority remanded the case for further proceedings because the court of appeals
had ruled that the drug policy violated the Oregon Constitution as well as the United
States Constitution. Id.; see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. Upon remand, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. Acton
v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 66 F.3d 217,218 (9th Cir. 1995). The court of appeals held that
the "Oregon Supreme Court would not offer greater protection under the provisions of
1996]
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the majority, began by reiterating that the Fourth Amendment
guarantee against "unreasonable search and seizure" extends to public
schools through the Fourteenth Amendment,38 and by confirming
that urine testing is considered a "search" for Fourth Amendment
purposes. 9 Under the Fourth Amendment, he wrote, the "ultimate
measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is
'reasonableness.' "' Although generally a warrant and probable
cause are required for a search to be reasonable, the Court noted that
these requirements do not apply to an administrative search when
"special needs" make them impractical.4 ' The Court declared that
the attributes of the school setting created these "special needs,"
making the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment inap-
plicable." The Court further stated that the Fourth Amendment did
not mandate that individualized suspicion be present in a school
search.43
In determining the "reasonableness" of the search, the Court
balanced the intrusion on James Acton's Fourth Amendment interests
the Oregon Constitution in this case." Id. Writing in dissent, Judge Reinhardt "strongly
disagree[d]" with the failure of the court of appeals to certify this question to the Oregon
Supreme Court. Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). In his view, the Oregon Supreme Court
should be allowed to interpret the Oregon Constitution:
I am not prepared to say that the Oregon Supreme Court will decide that the
rights of its school children must be shaped by the national frenzy over the war-
on-drugs. To the contrary, given its history of rugged individualism and its
concern for constitutional rights, Oregon might well opt for a more generous and
enlightened reading of its constitution.
Id. at 220 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
38. l at 2390; see supra note 10 (quoting the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution).
39. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390.
40. Id
41. Id. at 2390-91. An administrative search is distinguished from a criminal search
based upon the purpose and consequences of the search. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1520 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) ("If the consequences of noncompliance with
whatever standards the inspection is meant to uphold are noncriminal, the search is 'civil'
or 'administrative.' "), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). The Court has defined "special
needs" as needs "beyond the normal need for law enforcement." Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in the judgment)). See generally Andrea Lewis, Comment, Drug Testing:
Can Privacy Interests Be Protected Under the "Special Needs" Doctrine?, 56 BROOK. L.
REv. 1013, 1030-38 (1990) (discussing the emergence of the "special needs" doctrine and
its application to drug testing cases).
42. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
43. Id (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8). The Court distinguished T.L.O., a school
search case which involved individualized suspicion. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391; see infra
note 123 and accompanying text.
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against the school's interest in preventing drug use.' The Court
began this analysis by examining the legitimacy of the "privacy
interest upon which the search here at issue intrude[d]."'45 The
majority stated that the privacy expectations of minors are diminished
while they are attending school.4 6 The Court also emphasized that
the school district acted in its "custodial and tutelary" capacity, and
for many purposes the school officials acted in loco parentis.47
Although the Court acknowledged that the students do not " 'shed
their constitutional rights.., at the schoolhouse gate,' "4 it qualified
this statement by explaining that the "nature of [these] rights is what
is appropriate for children in school."49  Moreover, the majority
emphasized that student athletes have an even lesser expectation of
privacy and should expect intrusions upon this right.50
The Court next turned its attention to the nature of the
intrusion.M Justice Scalia examined the procedures utilized under
the drug policy and found the intrusion upon privacy to be
"negligible."52 The majority noted that the test does not reveal any
other medical information, such as pregnancy or diabetes, and that the
results are disclosed only to school officials.53 Finally, the majority
rejected the argument that the policy is overly intrusive because it
44. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390.
45. Id. at 2391.
46. IL at 2391-92.
47. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,684 (1986)). In loco
parentis means: "In the place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged, factitiously, with
a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." BLACK'S LAW DICiONARY 787 (6th ed.
1990). In Mercer v. State, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas declared that a search
conducted by a school official did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the official
acted in loco parentis. 450 S.W.2d 715, 717-18 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). According to the
Mercer court, the school official was not a governmental actor when he "demanded that
appellant disclose the contents of his pockets." Id. at 717. This view "enlarge[s] and
extend[s] the legal doctrine of in loco parentis to unconstitutional proportions." Id. at 718
(Hughes, J., dissenting).
48. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
49. Id-
50. l at 2392-93. The majority observed that an" 'element of "communal undress"
[is] inherent in athletic participation.' "Id. at 2393 (quoting Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe
County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988)).
51. IeL at 2393.
52. Id. See supra note 25 for a discussion of the urinalysis procedures.
53. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393. The Student Athlete Drug Policy does not allow school
officials to notify law enforcement authorities of positive test results. Id-
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requires students to identify in advance any prescription medications
they are taking.54
In the final segment of the opinion, the Court addressed the
nature and immediacy of the governmental interest, as well as the
efficacy of suspicionless drug testing in addressing this interest.5
The majority found the dual interest in preventing the use of drugs by
students and safeguarding student athletes from injury to be compel-
ling.56  Additionally, the Court cited the chaotic academic at-
mosphere resulting from drug use as support for its finding of
immediacy. 7 In examining the efficacy of the drug policy, the Court
focused upon the status of student athletes as role models and the
approval of the drug policy by the students' parents."
Justice O'Connor, writing in dissent, emphasized the absence of
a suspicion requirement in the Student Athlete Drug Policy.9 The
dissent maintained that "[flor most of our constitutional history, mass,
suspicionless searches have been generally considered per se un-
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."'  This
assertion rested upon an examination of the intent of the Framers of
the Fourth Amendment.6' According to the dissenters, the Framers
strongly opposed general searches, which their use of an objective
standard of probable cause evinces.62 The Acton dissenters favored
a policy based upon suspicion because it would lead to the testing of
fewer students and would give students control over whether they
were tested.63 The dissenters recognized the crisis caused by the use
of drugs, yet they warned the majority that the "greatest threats to
our constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis." 64
The Fourth Amendment states that "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause" and prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures. ' '61 The aim of these clauses is to curtail the discretion given
54. Id at 2394.
55. It at 2394-96.
56. I t at 2394-95.
57. It. at 2395.
58. Id. at 2395-96.
59. Id. at 2397-2407 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
60. It. at 2398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
61. Id at 2398-99 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63. It. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64. It at 2407 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra note 10 (stating the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution). The interaction between these two
clauses has led to a plethora of litigation and a morass of confusion for the Court. Craig
840 [Vol. 74
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to government officials by imposing a standard of reasonableness
upon their searches. 66  The plain language of the Amendment
appears to require that a warrant be issued prior to any search and
that the warrant be issued only if probable cause exists.67 However,
the Supreme Court has created certain exceptions to the warrant
requirement.6  The Court has allowed these exceptions when the
"burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search, 69 or when a compelling governmental
interest justifies.7" The Court has also recognized that in certain
contexts, such as administrative and "stop and frisk" searches, the
reasonableness of a search may be judged under a less stringent
standard than traditional probable cause.7
Modem notions of the relationship between the Fourth
Amendment and administrative searches can be traced to Camara v.
M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985);
see Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 349 (1974); Jeanette C. James, Comment, The Constitutionality of Federal Employee
Drug Testing: National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 109,
117 n.64 (1988) (discussing the differing theories regarding the interplay between the two
clauses of the Fourth Amendment).
66. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,528 (1967). In Schmerber
v. California, Justice Brennan declared that the "overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by
the State." 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra note 10 (discussing the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution). The standard of probable
cause aspires to be a "compromise" between the interests of citizens in avoiding "rash and
unreasonable interferences with privacy" and the interests of law enforcement "in
enforcing the law in the community's protection." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176 (1949).
68. See, eg., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,538 (1985) (border
search); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) ("plain view" search);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,149 (1925) (search under the automobile exception);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 395 (1914) (search incident to lawful arrest).
69. Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
70. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-27 (1968).
71. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1979). For many years, the standard
of probable cause stood as a "monolith" under which the reasonableness of all searches
and seizures was judged. Amsterdam, supra note 65, at 388. The modem view of
probable cause in the criminal context is illustrated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983). In Gates, the Court espoused a "totality of the circumstances" approach, which
allows for flexibility in the determination of probable cause. Id. at 230-39. Under this
approach, a magistrate who is deciding whether to issue a warrant must "make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him.... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place." 1d. at 238.
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Municipal Court,2 in which the Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of a suspicionless administrative search of a housing
unit.' In Camara, an apartment resident refused to allow a housing
inspector to make a warrantless search of his dwelling.74 Justice
White, writing for the majority, stressed the need for a warrant in
such searches.' According to the Court, the proper threshold for the
issuance of a warrant for an administrative search is
"reasonableness."76 As the Court stated: "[T]he warrant procedure
is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property is
justified by a reasonable governmental interest." The Court
conducted the reasonableness test "by balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails."78 Using this balancing
test, the Court found that Camara "had a constitutional right to insist
that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search., 79
One year later, in Terry v. Ohio,0 the Court used the balancing
test of. Camara in a different setting.81 Terry was searched by an
.72. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
73. Id. at 525-28. This issue was addressed by the Court previously in Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,372-73 (1959), and Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263,270-71 (1960) (per
curiam) (affirmed by an equally divided Court). In Camara, the Court overruled the
holdings of Frank and Eaton, two cases that held that "the fourth amendment's full
protections did not extend to housing inspections." Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth
Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383,
391 (1988).
74. Camara, 387 U.S. at 525-27. The search was part of a city-wide program to
improve housing conditions. Id. at 535.
75. Id. at 540.
76. Ld. at 539. In using the reasonableness standard, the Court left open the continued
possibility of warrantless searches: "[N]othing we say today is intended to foreclose
prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in
emergency situations." Id.
77. Id, The Court distinguished an administrative search from a criminal search by
emphasizing that the approach for an administrative search does not "endanger[] time-
honored doctrines applicable to criminal investigations." Id.
78. Id. at 537. The use of "reasonableness" did not "make[] a nullity of the probable
cause requirement in this area." Id. at 539. The balancing test of Camara merely provides
a mechanism for the determination of probable cause in the context of an administrative
search. See id.
79. Id at 540.
80. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
81. Id. at 21. The Court has also employed this balancing test in other contexts, such
as searches of automobiles at American borders for illegal aliens. See United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (permanent border checkpoints); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (roving border patrols). In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court
found the government's interest in reducing the number of illegal aliens to be great and
the intrusion upon the Fourth Amendment interests of the parties to be "limited."
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557. Accordingly, the Court upheld the use of permanent
[Vol. 74
DRUG TESTING STUDENT ATHLETES
officer who had become "thoroughly suspicious" when he observed
Terry and his friends pace back and forth in front of a store.' After
stopping Terry, the officer frisked him, found a pistol, and arrested
him.83 The Court found that the "stop and frisk" did come within
the realm of the Fourth Amendment;' it ruled, nevertheless, that
this type of police action did not require a warrant.' Accordingly,
the Court reasoned that the requirement of probable cause, which is
tied to the Warrant Clause, does not apply to a "stop and frisk."8 6
Under the Camara balancing test, the Terry Court weighed the
governmental interest in "crime prevention and detection," as well as
the interest in police safety, against Terry's interest in personal
security.' In upholding this search, the Court concluded that a
"stop and frisk" must be based upon "reasonable suspicion" to be
constitutional.8 8
In Delaware v. Prouse,89  the Court examined the
constitutionality of a suspicionless search conducted by a Delaware
patrolman to check the license and registration of the driver of an
checkpoints as a means of deterring the transportation of illegal aliens. Id. at 566-67. One
year earlier in Brignoni-Ponce, the Court struck down the use of random stops by roving
border patrol officers. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-87. The Court found these stops
to be unconstitutional due to the possibility of "unlimited interference with the use of
highways" and the potential for abuse by border patrol officers. Id. at 882-83. The
Martinez-Fuerte Court distinguished permanent checkpoints from roving patrols based
upon two characteristics of permanent checkpoints: the limited intrusion upon motorists
and the limited possibility of abuse due to the reduced amount of discretion given to the
officers. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.
82. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
83. Id at 6-7.
84. Id at 16-20. The Court reasoned that "whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Id. at 16.
Furthermore, it would be "sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful
exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an
attempt to find weapons is not a 'search.' "Id.
85. Id at 20.
86. See id.; Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a General Reasonableness
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 126 (1989). But see
Terry, 392 U.S. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that the "infringement on personal
liberty of any 'seizure' of a person can only be 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment
if we require the police to possess 'probable cause' before they seize him").
87. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-25.
88. See id at 27. According to Professor Wasserstrom, the Terry decision set a "fixed
evidentiary standard" for "stop and frisk" searches. Wasserstrom, supra note 86, at 126.
Under this standard, a "stop and frisk" is constitutional if the police officer can "point to
specific and articuable facts that give rise to a reasonable, individualized suspicion-not
merely a hunch-that the suspect is engaged in criminal activity." Id.
89. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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automobile." Upon conducting the search, the patrolman discovered
marijuana "in plain view" and the respondent was "subsequently
indicted for illegal possession of a controlled substance."91  To
determine the reasonableness of the search, the Court examined four
factors.9" First, the majority addressed the character of the privacy
interest.93 The interest involved in Prouse was that in remaining free
from an unreasonable seizure brought about by "stopping an
automobile and detaining its occupants."94  Second, the Court
addressed the nature of the intrusion.95 The majority found the
intrusion to be "physical and psychological" and compared it to the
intrusions at issue in cases involving border patrol searches for illegal
aliens. 6 The Court found the Prouse search to be similar to roving
patrols by border patrol agents because both "interfere[d] with
freedom of movement, [were] inconvenient, ... consume[d] time,"
and "may create substantial anxiety."97 Third, the Court addressed
the importance of the governmental interest.98 The interest that the
State of Delaware put forth was one of "promoting public safety upon
its roads,"99 and the Court agreed that this was an "important
end[]. ' '1"° The fourth factor the Court addressed was the efficacy of
the random spot checks in achieving Delaware's legitimate
interest.' The majority found itself "unconvinced that the
incremental contribution to highway safety of the random spot check
justifie[d] [its] practice under the Fourth Amendment."' ' The
majority accepted a policy of acting upon violations that officers
90. IM. at 650. Whether the respondent was the driver or an occupant of the
automobile was unclear, although the automobile was registered to the respondent. Id.
at 650 n.1.
91. Im. at 650.
92. Id. at 653-61. The Court examined these four factors as a means of "balancing
[the search's] intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Id. at 654 (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 653-55.
94. See id. at 653.
95. Id. at 655-57.
96. Id.; see supra note 81 (examining Martinez-Fuerte and Brignoni-Ponce).
97. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657. The majority agreed with the distinction made between
random stops and permanent checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte. Id.
98. Id. at 658, 659.
99. Id. at 658. The Court recognized the "vital interest in ensuring that only those
qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for
safe operation, and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements
are being observed." d.
100. Id. at 659.
101. Id. at 659-61.
102. Id. at 659.
[Vol. 74
DRUG TESTING STUDENT ATHLETES
observe, since such a policy is the most effective means of protecting
public safety." The Court warned of the "evil" present in the
"standardless and unconstrained discretion" officers may exercise in
random spot checks."' Accordingly, the Court held that the
random and suspicionless search conducted by the patrolman in
Prouse was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 05
The Supreme Court took Fourth Amendment analysis into the
schoolhouse in New Jersey v. TL.O. °  In TL.O., the Court ad-
dressed the search of a student's purse by an assistant vice-principal
at a New Jersey high school." The official originally based his
search of T.L.O.'s purse upon a suspicion that she had been smoking
cigarettes."~ During the search, the assistant vice-principal dis-
covered marijuana."9 The Court granted certiorari ostensibly to
"examine the appropriateness of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for
[unconstitutional] searches ... by public school [officials]." ' 0  The
Court ultimately avoided this question, however, by finding that the
search did not violate the Fourth Amendment."'
In its analysis, the TL. 0. majority first declared that the Fourth
Amendment "applies to searches conducted by public school of-
ficials.""' The Court found the view that school officials should be
"exempt from the dictates of the Fourth Amendment" because they
103. Id, But cf. id. at 666 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (declaring that the majority's belief
that acting upon observed violations is more effective than random spot checks is incorrect
because "[t]he whole point of enforcing motor vehicle safety regulations is to remove from
the road the unlicensed driver before he demonstrates why he is unlicensed").
104. Id. at 661.
105. Id. at 663. The majority recognized an exception for those cases involving "at least
articulable and reasonable suspicion." Id.
106. 469 U.S. 325, 328-29 (1985). This is not to say that the Fourth Amendment was
not already there. Presumably, it was always present in the schoolhouse. See ARVAL A.
MORRIs, THE CONsTITUTION AND AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION 291-93 (1989)
(discussing pre-T.L.O. school search cases in lower courts). T.L.O., however, allowed the
Court to clarify to what extent the Fourth Amendment protects students. See T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 333-43.
107. Id, at 328.
108. Id. T.L.O. was allegedly smoking with a friend in the lavatory. While the friend
admitted breaking the school rule against smoking, T.L.O. "denied that she had been
smoking ... and claimed that she did not smoke at all." IM
109. Id.
110. Id. at 327. The exclusionary rule excludes evidence obtained through a search or
seizure that violates the Fourth Amendment. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914). See generally Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment,
21 Am. CRiM. L. REV. 257, 257 n.2 (1984) (explaining Weeks and the exclusionary rule).
111. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 327-28.
112. Id. at 333.
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act in loco parentis to be "in tension with contemporary reality."" 3
Pronouncing the correct view, the majority stated: "[S]chool officials
act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the
parents, and they cannot claim the parents' immunity from the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment.""' 4
Next, the Court turned to balancing the student's interest in
privacy against the interest of school officials "in maintaining
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds.""' According to
the majority, students have a legitimate right to privacy, as well as a
right to "carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband
items.""16 However, the extreme importance of providing a strong
learning environment "requires some easing of the restrictions to
which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.""' 7
Consequently, the Court recognized that a warrant or probable cause
requirement for a school search would be impractical."' Justice
White, writing for the majority, explained that the "legality of a
search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness,
under all the circumstances, of the search.""'
The TL. 0. Court held that determining the reasonableness of a
search requires a twofold inquiry." First must come a deter-
mination of whether the search was " 'justified at its inception.' ""'
Second, the search actually performed must be " 'reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
113. Id. at 336.
114. Id. at 336-37. But see supra note 47 (discussing Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715,
717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), which declared that school officials do act in loco parentis).
115. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
116. Id at 338-39. The Court disagreed with the State of New Jersey's contention that
students have "no legitimate expectation of privacy." Id at 338. Under this view, a
student would be viewed in the same manner as a prisoner, and as the Court declared:
"We are not yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be equated for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 338-39.
117. Id. at 340.
118. Id
119. Id. at 341. In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority's
"implication that the balancing test for reasonableness is the rule rather than the
exception." Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). In his view, the
balancing test should be used only when "special needs" exist that "make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable." Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment). He believed that such a "special need" exists in a school setting and therefore
agreed with the majority's holding. Id. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment).
120. Id at 341.
121. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
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first place.' ""a As the Court stated, a search will usually withstand
the first part 3f the reasonableness test "when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the
student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the
school."" The scope of the search, furthermore, will be acceptable
when the "measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex
of the student and nature of the infraction."' 24 In applying these
standards to the facts of TL.O., the Court found the search to be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
The Court first addressed the issue of mandatory drug testing in
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association.'26  Skinner
involved Federal Railway Administration (FRA) regulations that
mandated drug testing by private railroads after serious train accidents
and allowed railroads to perform drug tests on employees who
violated certain safety rules.' 27
The Court found that the drug testing in Skinner was a state
action and that it was a "search" under the Fourth Amendment.12
In deciding the proper standard for its analysis, the Skinner Court
followed the rationale put forth by Justice Blackmun in TL.O. and
reiterated that a warrant and probable cause are not required when
122. L (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
123. IL at 341-42. Although this seems to support a suspicion requirement, the Court
explicitly stated that it declined to pass on "whether individualized suspicion is an essential
element of the reasonableness standard." Id. at 342 n.8. However, the Court's reasoning
seems to support a finding that suspicion is necessary unless the elements generally
required for an exception to the suspicion requirement-minimal privacy interests and
limited discretion-are present. See id.
124. Id. at 342.
125. Id. at 343-48.
126. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). Prior to 1989, lower courts had upheld drug testing in a
number of different contexts. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1443 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986) (upholding drug testing for jockeys); American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445, 448-49 (D.D.C. 1987) (upholding
drug testing for Department of Transportation employees); Mulholland v. Department of
the Army, 660 F. Supp. 1565, 1569-70 (E.D. Va. 1987) (upholding drug testing of civilian
employees of the U.S. Army).
127. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606.
128. Id. at 606-13.
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a situation involves "special needs." '129 Furthermore, the Court
dispensed with the need for individualized suspicion:
In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests
implicated by the search are minimal, and where an impor-
tant governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would
be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized
suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of
suspicion. We believe this is true of the intrusions in
question here.'3
After explaining its methodology, the Skinner majority turned to the
facts of the case.13' First, the Court addressed the intrusion of the
blood, breath, and urine tests upon the individual." It did not find
the blood and breath tests to involve a great imposition upon the in-
dividual's integrity,13 and, although urine tests involve an "excretory
function traditionally shielded by great privacy," the Court declared
that this intrusion is minimal when the procedure occurs in a "medical
environment.""' The opinion also emphasized the diminished
expectation of privacy based upon the employees' "participation in an
industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety. 135
129. Id. at 619; see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,351-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in the judgment). But see Skinner, 489 U.S. at 637 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for its use of "special needs" because, in Justice Marshall's view, "Constitutional
requirements like probable cause are not fair-weather friends, present when advantageous,
conveniently absent when 'special needs' make them seem not"). The majority found that
special needs existed in this case due to the interest of the government in "regulating the
conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety." Id. at 620.
130. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. But see id. at 643 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that
the Court has, "without exception, demanded that even minimally intrusive searches of the
person be founded on individualized suspicion").
131. Ie at 624.
132. Id. at 625-27.
133. Id. at 625. The Court characterized blood tests as" 'commonplace.' " Id. (quoting
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)). Breath tests were described as
minimally intrusive because they "do not require piercing the skin and may be conducted
safely outside a hospital environment and with a minimum of inconvenience or embar-
rassment." Id. at 625.
134. Id. at 626. In his dissent, Justice Marshall wrote: "Urination is among the most
private of activities. It is generally forbidden in public, eschewed as a matter of conver-
sation, and performed in places designed to preserve this tradition of personal seclusion."
Id. at 645-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 627. The Court qualified this statement: "We do not suggest, of course, that
the interest in bodily security by those employed in a regulated industry must always be
considered minimal." Id. at 628. The Court continued by stating that in the railroad
industry "employees have long been a principal focus of regulatory concern." Id.
Therefore, it appears that the Court will infer a minimal expectation of privacy in a given
industry if the industry has been subject to regulation for a long period of time.
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The majority contrasted the minimal intrusion upon the in-
dividual with the "compelling" interest of the government in
conducting suspicionless drug tests. 36  Without the tests, the
government would be unable to detect many impaired railroad
employees who could "cause great human loss."'37  In sum, the
Court held that the tests were not an "undue infringement on the
justifiable expectations of privacy of covered employees" and upheld
the testing.13
In the same year, the Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of drug testing of employees of the United States
Customs Service in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab.'39 The drug testing program under scrutiny required testing
of employees in positions involving drug interdiction, the carrying of
firearms, or the handling of "classified" information. 4° Relying on
Skinner, the Court began its analysis by restating that urinalysis
constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment and, therefore,
"must meet the reasonableness requirement."'41  The majority
found, moreover, that the testing served a "special governmental
needfl, beyond the normal need for law enforcement."' 42 When a
need exists beyond the "normal need" for law enforcement, courts
must balance the government's interest against the privacy interest of
the individual, in order to determine if the warrant and probable
cause requirements may be waived." In striking this balance,
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, cited the drug crisis and the
necessity that people who carry firearms not be impaired.'"
136. Id. at 628.
137. d But see id. at 653 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the deterrence
effect of postaccident testing because "[iut is, of course, the fear of the accident, not the
fear of a postaccident revelation, that deters").
138. Id. at 633, 634. In his dissent, Justice Marshall admonished the majority: "The
majority's acceptance of dragnet blood and urine testing ensures that the first, and worst,
casualty of the war on drugs will be the precious liberties of our citizens." Id at 636
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
139. 489 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1989).
140. Id at 660-61. The Court did not address the constitutionality of the testing of
employees handling "classified" information because it found the record to be inadequate
on this point. Id. at 677-78. Cf Harmon v. Thornbaugh, 878 F.2d 484, 496 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (declaring that "all [Department of Justice] employees holding top secret clearances
may constitutionally be required to undergo random urinalysis").
141. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
142. Id The drug testing in this instance was beyond the "normal need" of law
enforcement because the "[tiest results [could] not be used in a criminal prosecution of the
employee without the employee's consent." Id. at 666.
143. Id at 665.
144. Id. at 668-72.
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Furthermore, the majority emphasized the diminished expectation of
privacy enjoyed by customs officials. 45 Consequently, the Von
Raab Court held that the "compelling interests in safeguarding our
borders and the public safety outweigh the privacy expectations of
employees who seek to be promoted to positions that directly involve
the interdiction of illegal drugs or that require the incumbent to carry
a firearm."'
Writing in dissent in Von Raab, Justice Scalia played upon what
he believed to be a distinction between Von Raab and Skinner. 7
In contrast with Skinner, Justice Scalia found no "real evidence of a
real problem" in Von Raab.' In his view, the majority's finding of
a compelling interest was supported by "nothing but speculation.' 149
Concluding his argument, Justice Scalia warned the majority of the
possibility of a slippery slope if real evidence is not used as support
for findings of compelling governmental interests.1 50
Prior to Skinner and Von Raab, the Seventh Circuit addressed
the constitutionality of random drug testing of student athletes in
Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County School Corp."' Relying on
145. ldI at 672. The Court stated: "[E]mployees involved in drug interdiction
reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their fitness and probity.' Much the same
is true of employees who are required to carry firearms." Id.
146. Id. at 677.
147. Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 682 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The evidence offered by the majority does
appear to be speculative: "The physical safety of these employees may be threatened, and
many may be tempted not only by bribes from the traffickers with whom they deal, but
also by their own access to vast sources of valuable contraband seized and controlled by
the service." Id. at 669 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 686 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated: "Moreover, there is no
reason why this super-protection against harms arising from drug use must be limited to
public employees; a law requiring similar testing of private citizens ... would also be
constitutional." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. 864 F.2d 1309,1310 (7th Cir. 1988). The school required athletes and cheerleaders
to sign consent forms that allowed it to conduct the random tests throughout the athletic
season. Id. at 1310-11. Drug testing of college athletes has been challenged in various
state courts. See Steven 0. Ludd, Athletics, Drug Testing and the Right to Privacy: A
Question of Balance, 34 How. LJ. 599,618-25 (1991); Allison Rose, Comment, Mandatory
Drug Testing of College Athletes: Are Athletes Being Denied Their Constitutional Rights?,
16 PEPP. L. REV. 45, 58-59 (1988). A student athlete at Northeastern University filed suit
claiming that mandatory drug testing violated the Massachusetts State Civil Rights Act and
Massachusetts' right of privacy statute. Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 532 N.E.2d 49, 50
(Mass. 1989); see Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 11H, 111
(Law. Co-op. 1988) (Civil Rights Act); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § 1B (Law. Co-op.
1986) (right of privacy act). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the drug
testing program did not violate these statutes. Bally, 532 N.E.2d at 54. Student athletes
at the University of Colorado challenged mandatory, random, suspicionless drug testing.
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TL.O., the Tippecanoe court stated that the probable cause and
warrant requirements were not applicable to this school search due to
the "special needs" of the school setting." The court listed four
elements that characterize warrantless, suspicionless searches that are
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment: (1) an individual's
diminished expectations of privacy; (2) "weighty" governmental
interests and ineffective alternative means; (3) limited discretion for
the officials conducting the search; and (4) no intention by those
conducting the search of seeking criminal sanctions." In applying
the facts of Tippecanoe to these elements, the court concluded that
student athletes have diminished privacy expectations and that the
school's interest in drug prevention is substantial.'" Moreover, the
Court held that the school adequately limited the discretion of school
officials conducting the search and highlighted the use of the test for
"noncriminal and rehabilitative purposes."'55  Based upon these
findings, the court ruled that the drug testing did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 15 6
In another case affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, Brooks v. East
Chambers Consolidated Independent School District,57 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas struck down
the drug testing by a Texas school district of all students participating
in extracurricular activities. 58  The Brooks court, under a
University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 930 (Colo. 1993). The Colorado
Supreme Court determined that the drug testing constituted an unreasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article H, Section 7, of the
Colorado Constitution. IL at 935; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7.
Student athletes at Stanford University brought a similar suit against the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) alleging that the NCAA's program of random
drug testing violated the Privacy Initiative of the California Constitution. Hill v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994); see CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I,
§ 1 (amended 1974). The Supreme Court of California upheld the drug testing program
based upon the voluntary nature of intercollegiate athletics and the NCAA's interest in
maintaining drug-free competition. Hill, 865 P.2d at 658, 669.
152. Tippecanoe, 864 F.2d at 1313-16. The court focused upon the "special needs" for
quick response to disciplinary problems in schools, as well as the need to "teach students
in a safe and secure learning environment." Id at 1314.
153. Id. at 1317-18.
154. Id. at 1322. In addressing the governmental interest, the court stated that student
athletes and cheerleaders could be singled out "[b]ecause of their high visibility and
leadership roles." Id. at 1320.
155. Id. at 1322.
156. Id..
157. 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989), affd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).
158. It at 760. The principal of East Chambers High School conducted his initial
investigation into the drug problem in the district's schools by having three students look
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reasonableness standard, found no evidence that participants in
extracurricular activities were more likely than nonparticipants to use
drugs.'59 The court also disagreed with the school district that its
plan would be an effective means of curbing drug use.W It conse-
quently held that the compelling interest the school put forth did not
reach the level of sufficiency of the interests championed in Skinner
and Von Raab.'6' Accordingly, the court ruled that "[t]he intrusion
on personal privacy that the school child must undergo in the East
Chambers County school system cannot be justified by the global goal
of prevention of substance abuse."'6
The split between the Seventh and Fifth Circuits regarding drug
testing of students set the stage for the Supreme Court's analysis in
Acton. 6" To resolve this split, the majority balanced the competing
interests within a framework similar to that used by the Court in
Prouse.'6  In order to analyze the reasonableness of the search,
however, the Court first had to dispense with the probable cause and
warrant requirements by showing the existence of a "special
need."' ' The Court relied upon its holding in TL.O. and found
that the school setting creates special needs for "swift and informal
disciplinary procedures" that make the warrant and probable cause
requirements impractical." Additionally, the Court dismissed the
through the yearbook and answer questions about the student population. Id. This
"investigation" led to an estimate that 97% of the student body used alcohol and one-third
used drugs. Id.
159. Id. at 764. The court stated: "[L]ogic would dictate that students who participate
in athletics and other extra-curricular activities are, in fact, less likely to use drugs and
alcohol.. . ." Id.
160. Id. at 765.
161. Id. at 766. In distinguishing the facts of Brooks from those of Skinner and Von
Raab, the federal district court stated, "School activities, on campus and off, do not carry
the inherent risks associated with the enforcement duties with which Customs employees
are charged or with the responsibility that railway employees have with heavy machinery
and sometimes dangerous cargo." Id.
162. Id. at 766.
163. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2386. Compare Shaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County Sch.
Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1324 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding drug testing of student athletes) with
Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 766 (finding drug testing of all students participating in extracur-
ricular activities to be unconstitutional).
164. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391-96; see supra notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
165. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390-91.
166. Id. at 2391; see Lewis, supra note 41, at 1030-38. This rationale was sound in the
context of T.L.O., in which a school official was forced to respond immediately to the
suspicion of smoking. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328-29 (1985). The search
at issue in Acton, however, was part of a formal program of drug testing lasting an entire
school year. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389-90. This does not comport with a need for "swift
and informal" procedures. See id. at 2391. This extension of T.L. 0. could reflect a settled
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requirement of individualized suspicion for drug testing within the
school setting.67 Although the school search upheld in TL.O. was
based upon individualized suspicion, the Court found two reasons to
dismiss the need for suspicion for school drug testing. First, a
footnote of TL.O. held open the possibility of suspicionless school
searches in other contexts." Second, the Court had upheld
suspicionless drug testing in both Skinner and Von Raab.69
The first part of the reasonableness test required the majority to
address the nature of the privacy interest.' This inquiry led the
Court to retreat from much of its holding in TL.O. regarding the
diminished expectations of privacy held by students in a public school
setting."' In TL.O., the Court held that school officials "act as
representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents,
and they cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment."' However, the Acton majority sidestepped
the position of TL. 0. by stressing the "custodial and tutelary" duties
of school officials." By couching the argument in different terms,
belief by the Court that any search conducted by school officials within the school involves
"special needs." See generally Donald L. Beci, School Violence: Protecting Our Children
and the Fourth Amendment, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 817, 833-39 (1992) (discussing the
relationship between the Fourth Amendment and the "special needs" of the school setting
created by violence).
167. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390-91. The lack of suspicion was the main point of
contention for the dissent. Id. at 2397-98 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see infra notes 205-08
and accompanying text. The Court failed to consider whether a test based upon the level
of suspicion used in Terry--"reasonable suspicion"-may have been feasible in this
context. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
168. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391. In T.L.O., the Court refused to decide whether in-
dividualized suspicion is an "essential element" of all school searches. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
at 342 n.8; see supra note 123. The acceptance of suspicionless drug testing may give
school officials more leeway in other contexts, such as school locker searches. The T.L. 0.
Court refused to address this issue. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337-38 n.5.
169. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (drug testing of railroad employees); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (drug testing of Customs officials). The
Court has also acknowledged the constitutionality of suspicionless searches of automobiles
for illegal aliens, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 564-67 (1976), and drunk
drivers, Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,449-55 (1990). Acton, 115 S.
Ct. at 2391.
170. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
171. Id. at 2391-92. In T.L.O., the Court rejected the idea that school officials act in
loco parentis in relation to students. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-37. But see supra note 47
(discussing Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 717-18 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), in which the
court declared that school officials act in loco parentis to the extent necessary to effect the
school's purpose).
172. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-37.
173. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392.
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the Court succeeded in further reducing students' rights by lowering
their supposed expectation of privacy. 4 Additionally, the majority
tipped the scales in favor of the use of drug testing by explaining that
student athletes possess even lower expectations of privacy than the
rest of the student body.75 The majority found support for this
position in Tippecanoe, while disregarding contrary sentiments from
Brooks.76 Furthermore, the majority analogized the position of
student athletes to that of "adults who choose to participate in a
'closely regulated industry,' " noting that they "have reason to expect
intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy."'77
In Skinner, the Court had emphasized that urination is a
"function traditionally shielded by great privacy."'7" Accordingly,
the Acton Court focused its attention upon the manner in which this
act was monitored under Vernonia's drug policy.179 The tests per-
formed under the Vernonia program required a monitor to stand and
listen for the "sounds of urination."'" These tests also required the
students to inform the school, including teachers and coaches, of any
prescription medications they were taking prior to this test.' 8' The
Court conceded that "this raise[d] some cause for concern."" This
concern, however, was apparently minor, the Court dismissing it for
failure to establish "a difference that respondents are entitled to rely
on here."'' Whether this came in response to the status of James
174. See id. The belief that students have a diminished expectation of privacy is not
in accord with language of prior holdings: "The authority possessed by the State to
prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools although concededly very broad,
must be exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 574 (1975); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969) (pronouncing that students do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the
schoolhouse gate").
175. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
176. ld.; see supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
177. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 627 (1989); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972)). This analogy
could be extended to all students who participate in voluntary extracurricular activities.
178. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626.
179. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393-94.
180. 1I at 2389.
181. Id at 2394.
182. Id. The Court stated that it was "significant that the tests at issue here only look
for drugs, and not for whether the student is, for example, epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic."
Id. at 2393. A requirement, however, that students disclose that they are using oral
contraceptives, for example, or medication to control epilepsy, should have raised the same
concerns for the Court.
183. Id. at 2394. In Von Raab, Justice Scalia expressed much more concern for the
invasion of privacy caused by urinalysis. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
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Acton as a student, or whether the Court no longer views close
monitoring of urination and advance disclosure of prescription
medications as significant intrusions of privacy, is unclear.l 4
In the analysis of administrative searches, the nature of the state's
interest apparently had been the deciding factor in a determination of
reasonableness." In examining this second factor, however, the
Acton Court quickly dispelled this notion."6 In the majority's view,
the sole question is not whether the governmental interest reaches a
level to make it compelling.' 7 Rather, a court must ask whether
the interest is "important enough to justify the particular search at
hand, in light of other factors."'88 Therefore, according to the
Court, one must look not only at the "quantum" of governmental
interest, but at whether that "quantum" of governmental interest is
enough to justify the search at hand. 9
Justice Scalia characterized the interest in Acton as one of
"[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren."' 9 Viewing
the interest in Acton in the aggregate provided a profitable com-
parison with the interest in Von Raab (enforcement of drug interdic-
tion) and Skinner (prevention of drug-related railroad accidents).'
Very few people would dispute that the interest in preventing
schoolchildren's drug use is extremely compelling. Upon declaring
this to be the interest, however, the Court apparently realized that
this aggregate interest was not narrowly tied to the drug testing of
student athletes in the Vernonia schools." The Court qualified its
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that it is
"obvious" that production of a urine sample while being closely monitored by a member
of the same sex "is a type of search particularly destructive of privacy and offensive to
personal dignity." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, he expressed his dismay in
Von Raab that "[u]ntil today this Court has upheld a bodily search separate from arrest
and without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing only with respect to prison inmates,
relying upon the uniquely dangerous nature of that environment." Id (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
184. The respondents argued that the Von Raab and Skinner drug tests required the
employees to disclose information only to medical personnel. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.
185. See id
186. See id.
187. I
188. AL at 2394-95.
189. Id
190. 1& at 2395.
191. See id. But cf. Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp.
759, 766 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (stating that the school district's drug testing program could not
be "justified by the global goal of prevention of substance abuse"), affd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th
Cir. 1991).
192. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395.
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statement of the interest by stressing that "this program is directed
more narrowly to drug use by school athletes .... . 193 At this point,
however, the Court had already expanded the interest, which easily
allowed the state's interest in Acton to reach the level of the interests
in Skinner and Von Raab.94
The immediacy of the governmental interest also factored into
the discussion of whether the interest was "important enough" to
justify the search.'"9 The Court's finding of immediacy was based
on reports by school officials in Vernonia that the discipline problem
had reached intolerable levels within the schools.'96 The focus on
immediacy may reflect the Court's concern with the War on Drugs
and the nationwide epidemic of drug use among students.Y7
Perhaps this concern also explains Justice Scalia's switch from the
dissent in Von Raab to the majority in Acton.9 '
The threat of continued drug use by students also explains the
majority's reasoning in examining the efficacy of Vernonia's drug
program. As if it were an undisputed fact, the Court declared that it
was "self-evident" that student athletes were "role model[s]" and that
drug testing of these athletes would eliminate a school-wide problem
"largely fueled" by these athletes.'99 Furthermore, the majority
193. Id.
194. Whether the interest in preventing injury of athletes through the elimination of
drug use, standing alone, would have been sufficient to justify the drug testing procedures
is unclear.
195. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395. Immediacy was not one of the factors utilized by the
Prouse Court. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655-61 (1979).
196. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395.
197. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
198. In Von Raab, Justice Scalia alleged that the majority reached its holding through
speculation. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681-85
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. The incidents
alleged in Acton may have also lacked factual support. According to the respondents,
there was "little evidence of Vernonia students using drugs, and no evidence of any athlete
in Vernonia ever competing while on drugs, let alone causing or sustaining injury."
Respondents' Brief at 2, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (No. 94-
590). Furthermore, "the District conceded, in a pre-trial interrogatory, that it [was] unable
to confirm so much as one drug-related injury in its entire history of the sports program."
Ld. at 6.
199. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395-96. In Brooks, the district court judge argued that this
logic was completely faulty:
[L]ogic would dictate that students who participate in athletics and other extra-
curricular activities are, in fact, less likely to use drugs and alcohol, if only
because Texas law forbids students who fail courses from participating in extra-
curricular activities, and presumably, heavy drug or alcohol use will have a
negative impact on academic performance.
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confirmed the notion from Skinner that the least intrusive means is
not necessary in order for the means to be effective.' ° The
majority bolstered this position in the school context by relying once
again on the proposition that school officials act in loco parentis.20'
Utilizing this notion, the majority declared that it "may be imprac-
ticable" to use suspicion-based testing because parents who favor
random drug testing may not favor testing based upon suspicion.'
Furthermore, the Court viewed "accusatory" testing as
"transform[ing] the process into a badge of shame. 23  The Court
seemed unconcerned with the level of accusation and shame resulting
from a positive test result under Vernonia's suspicionless testing
scheme.' 4
The majority's repudiation of a less-intrusive suspicion-based test
triggered a dissent from Justice O'Connor, whom Justices Stevens and
Souter joined, that recognized the need for a response to the drug
problem in American schools, yet acknowledged in a different manner
the strong protections that the Fourth Amendment bestowed.'S
The dissent argued that suspicion should be the rule, rather than the
exception, and stated that suspicionless searches have been allowed
only "where it has been clear that a suspicion-based regime would be
Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759,764 (S.D. Tex. 1989),
affd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991). If the goal of drug testing is to deter drug use in the
school, the test should cover all drugs, especially alcohol and steroids. However, the
Vernoria drug policy failed to mandate this. See supra note 26 (discussing the failure of
the drug testing program to test for alcohol and steroids).
200. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989).
201. See supra note 47.
202. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
203. Id.
204. See iUt at 2405 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor argued that the
accusation in the Vernonia drug program results from a student testing positive, and the
shame comes from the notification of the student's parents and the possible suspension
from athletic competition that would effectively put other students on notice that the
suspended student had tested positive for drugs. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor further stated:
[A]ny testing program that searches for conditions plainly reflecting serious
wrongdoing can never be made wholly nonaccusatory from the student's
perspective, the motives for the program notwithstanding; and for the same
reason, the substantial consequences that can flow from a positive test, such as
suspension from sports, are invariably-and quite reasonably-understood as
punishment.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
205. Id- at 2397-2407 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
1996]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ineffectual."'  Although the majority attempted to provide a
rationale for a finding that such a search program would be ineffec-
tive, the lack of sufficient support for this rationale demonstrates that
the debate is not settled."° Although a testing program covering all
student athletes would almost certainly be more effective than any
suspicion-based testing program, the protections of the Constitution,
and more specifically the Fourth Amendment, "come with a
price."" This is not to say, however, that a plan that tests all
athletes is cost-free.
Beyond the question of the constitutionality of a random drug
testing program for student athletes lie two interrelated inquiries.
The first is whether adequate arguments exist to support the singling
out of student athletes. The second is whether Acton sets the stage
for the extension of student drug testing beyond athletes. These
questions probe deeply into the motivations and repercussions of drug
testing of student athletes and help provide insight into the future of
such programs.
In Acton, the Court felt that the status of student athletes as
"role models" and the potential for serious injury to impaired athletes
justified their selection as the sole subjects of drug testing. 9
However, as the dissent avowed, student athletes may have been
selected so that the drug policy would "pass constitutional
muster."210  Furthermore, this program provides a backhanded
method of testing nearly the entire student body.21'
The first basis put forth by the Court for treating athletes
differently was the " 'element of "communal undress" inherent in
206. Id at 2398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In support of this proposition, one
commentator has stated that individualized suspicion should be a "component of
reasonableness" because "it recognizes the historical importance of individualized suspicion
to the framers of the Constitution, and it provides needed guidance to courts and
governmental officials, avoiding the slippery slope of an unprincipled reasonableness
analysis." Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 483, 627 (1995).
207. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396; id at 2403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that
the "Court never seriously engage[d] the practicability of [a suspicion] requirement in the
instant case").
208. Id at 2404 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329
(1987)).
209. Id. at 2392-93, 2396.
210. Id. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
211. Two-thirds of the high school and three-fourths of the junior high students
participated in interscholastic athletics. Respondents' Brief at 48 n.31, Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (No. 94-590); Petitioner's Brief at 3, Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (No. 94-590).
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athletic participation.' ,,212 Although it may be true that athletes
have a lesser expectation of privacy in their roles as athletes, this
expectation does not cross over to their roles as students.2"
Furthermore, the concept of "communal undress" could just as easily
be applied to any student participating in a voluntary gym class.
The Court found additional support for the separate treatment of
athletes in the decision of athletes to participate voluntarily in
sports.214 This decision carries with it the obligation to submit to a
physical examination, and apparently the Court equated the intrusion
of the examination with the intrusion resulting from urinalysis. 21
As the dissent pointed out, however, these two situations are easily
distinguishable.216 Moreover, if voluntariness is the touchstone, then
a system in which all students involved in voluntary extracurricular
activities would be tested for drug use is easy to imagine.
The Court also emphasized the greater threat to drug-impaired
student athletes due to "impairment of judgment, slow reaction time,
and a lessening of the perception of pain., 217  As the majority
noted, however, in an environment of learning, the impairment caused
by drug use hinders the learning process and provides distractions to
all students.218 Therefore, although drug use may pose a greater
physical threat to athletes, one can not discount the psychological and
physiological effects of drug use upon all students.219
The majority's perception of student athletes as "role models"
also contributed to its acceptance of a program designed to test only
this segment of the student population.' Although this perception
212. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393 (quoting Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County Sch.
Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (1988)).
213. Arguably, athletes who are tested in order to combat the drug problem in the
entire school are tested in their capacity as students.
214. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
215. Id at 2392.
216. Id. at 2405 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor emphasized that physical
examinations and vaccinations "are not searches for conditions that reflect wrongdoing on
the part of the student, and so are wholly nonaccusatory and have no consequences that
can be regarded as punitive." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 2395.
218. Id. The majority stated: "And of course the effects of a drug-infested school are
visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the
educational process is disrupted." Id.
219. The effects of drug use and addiction are not confined to certain segments within
the school population or society as a whole. See POWELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 41.
Furthermore, the adverse impacts of drug use upon learning are not confined to student
athletes. See id. at 46-47. In general, all students who are addicted to drugs "demonstrate
behaviors that are counterproductive to learning in school classrooms." Id.
220. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395-96.
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may find truth in a portion of our nation's schools, it is somewhat out-
dated."' Different extracurricular activities attract different types
of students, and not all students view athletes as role models. Further-
more, the fact that two-thirds of the Vernonia student population
participates in athletics diminishes the aggregate impact on the school
from the influence of the conduct of athletes upon non-athletes.2"
The possible extension of Acton to the drug testing of all public
school students was a noticeable concern for a majority of the
Court.' The language of the majority opinion, however, makes it
unclear whether such an extension is permissible? 4  The Court's
concern is apparent in the words of the majority: "We caution against
the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass
constitutional muster in other contexts."'  This appears to cut
against the possibility of an extension of Acton to suspicionless drug
testing of all students. In qualifying this statement, however, the
Court declared: "The most significant element in this case is the first
we discussed: that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the
government's responsibilities, under a public school system, as
guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care." 6 This con-
cern is present within any drug testing scheme for students, including
mass testing of an entire student population.
221. In many schools, athletes are viewed as role models. DONNA EDER ET AL.,
SCHOOL TALK: GENDER AND ADOLESCENT CULTURE 13 (1995). However, students
participating in other highly visible activities, such as drama or cheerleading, are also
viewed as role models in modem schools. I&
222. This point was underscored by the respondents: "Not everyone can be a role
model. And there can't be more students leading than being led." Respondents' Brief at
48 n.31, Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (No. 94-590).
223. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396; see id. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). This
extension could be limited to all students participating in extracurricular activities. Butsee
Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759,766 (S.D. Tex. 1989)
(striking down a program designed to test all students participating in extracurricular
activities), aff'd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991). An extension to all students involved with
extracurricular activities could utilize the Acton majority's emphasis on the voluntary
nature of athletic participation. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393; see supra notes 214-16 and
accompanying text.
224. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396. In New Jersey, a school district attempted to include
drug testing as part of its annual physical examinations of all students. See Odenheim v.
Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709, 709-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1985). The court found this policy to be unconstitutional because the school's policy
violated the students' "right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure ... rights to due
process and ... legitimate expectation of privacy and personal security." Id. at 713.
225. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
226. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Additional language of the majority opinion furnishes subsequent
litigators with plenty of support for a school-wide drug testing
program. First, the majority designated the central issues in the case
to be the status of the test subjects as students "who have been
committed to the temporary custody of the State as school-
master." 7  Second, the majority referred to the primary
governmental interest at issue in Acton as the interest in "[d]eterring
drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren."' These two elements
are present in a policy that mandates the drug screening of all
students. Furthermore, a strong argument could be made that the
interest in preventing drug use by the schoolchildren of our nation
would be better served by the testing of all students.
Perhaps in recognition of the open-ended nature of the majority
opinion, Justice Ginsburg authored a concurrence, in which she
expressed her interpretation of the opinion: "I comprehend the
Court's opinion as reserving the question whether the District, on no
more than the showing made here, constitutionally could impose
routine drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with others
in team sports, but on all students required to attend school." 9
Although Justice Ginsburg sought to make clear that Acton did not
confer approval upon school-wide testing, her concurrence, in
conjunction with the language of the majority opinion, foreshadows
and perhaps invites future litigation upon this very issue. If Acton is
any indication of the Court's leniency in the area of school searches,
and more specifically drug testing, then an era of school-wide drug
testing may be near.230
The Supreme Court's approval of suspicionless drug testing of
student athletes leaves unanswered the question of whether random
227. Id. at 2391.
228. Id. at 2395. In applauding the Supreme Court's decision in Acton, President
Clinton foreshadowed the possible extension of drug testing to all students:
My administration's support for the right of school officials to properly test their
high school athletes is part of our overall strategy to make schools places where
young people can be safe and drug-free. I believe that to be a good student or
a good athlete a student cannot use drugs. Drug use at schools will not and
should not be tolerated.
Statement on the Supreme Court Decision on the Student Athlete Drug Testing Case, 31
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1136 (June 26, 1995).
229. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
230. If the testing programs instituted by school districts are voluntary, they will be
impossible to challenge. KEVIN B. ZEESE, DRUG TESTING LEGAL MANUAL § 7.02[3]
(1994). Moreover, some evidence suggests that voluntary programs are more successful
than mandatory programs. See id.
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drug testing of all schoolchildren may be a constitutionally acceptable
weapon in the nation's War on Drugs. Although most would agree
that something must be done to fight this epidemic, Acton does little
to quell doubts as to the efficacy of suspicionless drug testing of
student athletes. Whether an extension of Acton will pass
constitutional muster remains to be seen. Further litigation will
undoubtedly ensue, and the freedom from intrusion upon privacy for
all students will hang in the balance.
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